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OF BULLDOGS AND SOAPY SAMS: THE 
COMMON LAW AND EVOLUTIONARY 
THEORY 
 





Ronald Dworkin: '[Pragmatism] is philosophically a dog's dinner.' Richard Posner: 
'I take it [Dworkin] does not much like dogs.' Ronald Dworkin: 'As it happens, I like 
dogs very much.' 
Richard Posner: 'As a cat person, I am disappointed. I hope I will be forgiven for 
having thought him distinctly feline.'1 
 
The venue-the annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science in Oxford's newly built Museum of Natural History-and the occasion-a 
lecture on European social development by a relatively unknown American 
scholar, Dr John William Draper-were fairly unremarkable. But the unscheduled 
debate that followed, although much anticipated by the unprecedented and 
eminent 700 in attendance, has become the fabled stuff of historical moment. 
Occurring on Saturday 30 June 1860, only six months after the publication of 
Charles Darwin's On The Origin of Species, the face-off over the controversial 
theory of evolution by natural selection was between the conservative and 
sceptical Bishop of Oxford, 'Soapy Sam' Wilberforce, and the uncompromising 
scientist and leading public intellectual of the day, Thomas Henry 'Bulldog' 
Huxley. While the topic was supposed to be the subtle scientific implications of 
Darwin's evolutionary account, the agenda was much broader and more polarized; 
it pitted the established church order against an emerging scientific new wave. 
In so doing, this Victorian debate set the tone and terms for lengthy intellectual 
debate about evolution and much more over the next century and a half. For all 
its imputed sophistication and scholarliness, parts of contemporary jurisprudence 
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have come to exhibit the melodramatic and vindictive quality of that famous 
Oxford debate. Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner's recent exchanges not only 
resonate with similar tart rhetoric, but their substantive positions have uncanny 
resemblances to those of Soapy Sam and the Bulldog. 
Those resemblances can be found in their respective positions within the 
'evolutionary paradigm' for explaining the development of the common law. This 
paradigm has a 200-year history in accounts of common law traditions and 
development, and has become increasingly sophisticated in the past twenty-five 
years. We have picked out Dworkin and Posner because they have well known 
and perhaps representative views for two common positions within this 
paradigm, but the offerings are rich for those with an interest in subspecies, 
precursors, and filiation. We will assess one of the deeper jurisprudential 
differences that separate Dworkin and Posner: their respective stances on the 
tradition of the common law, especially its operation and development. While on 
the face of it both sides view the legal process and adjudication as distinctly human 
enterprises, they disagree profoundly over whether this enterprise is better 
understood in the philosophical cast of natural law or in the social-scientific 
terminology of 'efficient' decision-making. Whereas Dworkin insists that law must 
be understood as a site for abstract and coherent reflection on the moral basis of 
the good society, Posner contends that law is less about theory and more about 
facts in that judges should do whatever is most useful in the particular social 
circumstances. It is presented as a case of the soapy moralist against the 
bulldoggish pragmatist. For one, adjudication is being driven by some moral 
force that is much bigger and better than any single judge; for the other, the judge 
is an adaptionist agent for society's struggle for survival. However, on closer 
inspection neither combatant's position is quite what it appears to be. Both 
Dworkin and Posner have, if you will, a Creationist flavour, in that they each fall 
 
back on the discredited idea that there is one particular truth to law that does or 
should transcend all others and that there is one method for elucidating and 
perpetuating that truth. 
Whatever the differences between Dworkin and Posner, we suggest that both 
they and a good portion of theorizing on evolution-and-law employ that 
paradigm at serious risk to their projects, because in our reading they import a 
contradiction central to their propositions through the analogy to evolutionary 
theory. This is that, even if change in the common law occurs through some sort 
of natural selection akin to that proposed by Darwinian evolution, the mechanism 
by which change operates in evolutionary theory, the transmission of genetic 
material, has been characterized as chance-like, random, or even the site of 
'mistakes' in replication. We suspect that this insight from evolution is not central 
to either Dworkin's nor Posner's views on common law. But we do contend that 
any analogy to evolution must cope with this particular aspect of that analogy, as 
being one of two core elements that describe and explain change and 
development. Perhaps in reaction to this threat, writers within the evolution and 
law paradigm have generated a number of much more sophisticated responses 
or amendments to the basic analogy employed or implied by Posner and 
Dworkin. Part of this chapter traces attempts to cope with exactly that sort of 
indeterminacy in open systems. 
But our dominant ambition in this paper is to flush out the lingering 
theological traces that clog up Dworkin's approach and that also pushes through 
on the pragmatic aspirations of Posner's initiative. In short, we wish to clarify the 
political implications of much of the evolution-as-law paradigm through a 
comparison of Posner and Dworkin's place within it. While Posner is correct to 
chastise Dworkin for the divine intimations of his philosophical theorizing, he 
fails to heed the radical import of his own pragmatic critique. Similarly, 
 
although Dworkin is correct to come down hard on Posner for the disingenuous 
modesty of his pragmatic perspective, he wastes the opportunity to put his own 
abstract house into working order. Our intervention seeks to demonstrate law's 
pragmatic character at the same time that it confirms adjudication's political 
quality. We also spend time discussing some aspects and history of 
evolutionary theory as it pertains to our argument. As such, this paper is 
divided into five parts. In the first part we sketch the initial terms of 
engagement over Darwin in the scientific community; the emphasis is on 
mapping the territory, not on mining it, and on suggesting the components  of  a 
common-that  is non-specialist discourse  of evolution. The second section explores 
the different ways in which the evolutionary insight has found its way into legal 
studies and associated claims to enhance an appreciation of law's historical 
development. In the third section we focus on the contributions of Dworkin and 
Posner around the relevance of evolutionary thinking to law; the point is to 
show, not so much that they are of little value, for they are not, but that they 
overreach themselves in making the claims that they do. In the final section we 
make modest proposals for the construction of legal traditions, their change and 
development. Throughout the essay, as well as confining ourselves to a largely 
descriptive brief, we emphasize that the jurisprudential challenge is more to 
explain change than to explain stability and that no change is good or bad in itself, 
but will depend on the context. By way of conclusion we recognize that, when 
it comes to law and adjudication, evolution is as much a responsibility as it is a 
necessity. 
 
Terms of Engagement 
After Draper's lacklustre and forgettable lecture on 'The Intellectual Development of 
 
Europe Considered with Reference to the Views of Mr. Darwin', Bishop Wilberforce 
took the floor. As expected, he gave a powerful, if over-wrought renunciation of 
Darwin's theory; he was not known as Soapy Sam for nothing. Briefed by Robert 
Owen, one of Darwin's fiercest scientific critics, he lambasted the evolutionary 
initiative and restated the Creationist case. Echoing the words of his yet-to-be-
published review of the Origin, Wilberforce made sport with Darwin and his earnest 
defenders. After noting Darwin's apparent observations about 'our unsuspected 
cousinship with mushrooms', he asked 'is it credible that, even if transmutations were 
rapidly occurring, all favourable varieties of turnips are tending to become men?'2 At 
the end of his rather bombastic harangue, Wilberforce turned to Huxley, who was 
sitting close by him, and said 'I should like to ask Professor Huxley who is about to 
tear me to pieces when I sit down, as to his belief in being descended from an ape. Is 
it on his grandfather's or his grandmother's side that the ape ancestry comes in?' As 
Huxley stood up to speak the tension was high. But the normally snappy and 
high-strung Huxley managed to muzzle his bulldog tendencies. Turning to his 
neighbour, Sir Benjamin Brodie, the Queen's surgeon, he whispered 'the Lord have 
delivered him into my hands'. 
In a deft stroke of gamesmanship, Huxley replied: 'I should feel it no shame to 
have risen from such an origin, but I should feel it a shame to have sprung from 
one who prostituted the gifts of culture and eloquence to the service of 
prejudice and falsehood.' At the time, this was strong stuff and a member of the 
audience, Lady Brewster, fainted at hearing a Bishop so publicly denounced. But 
the debate was not finished. Several noted members of the audience rose to 
speak, including a bible-brandishing Robert Fitzroy, Darwin's former friend and 
captain of the Beagle ship on which Darwin had made his fateful trip some 
thirty years before, who denounced Darwin as a heretic and an apostate. The 
final speaker was Joseph Hooker, the Director of the Royal Botanical Gardens 
 
at Kew; he had his own political as well as scientific reasons for championing 
the Darwinian cause. In contrast to the fevered interventions that preceded his, 
Hooker wisely made a less emotional and more learned riposte to Wilberforce's 
assault. Although less memorable than Huxley's verbal fireworks, his hard-hitting 
arguments against Wilberforce probably did more for the longer term benefit of 
the Darwinian cause: 'facts in this science which before were inexplicable to me 
became one by one explained by [Darwin's] theory, and conviction has been thus 
gradually forced upon an unwilling convert.'3 
 
 
By most accounts, a rampant Huxley and the scientific academy won the day 
over a chagrined Wilberforce and his clerical enthusiasts. However, as the 
intervening decades have revealed, Creationism is not so easily vanquished. 
Moreover, the 'scientific cause' has not always been helped by the fact that many 
of those who claim to be inspired by Darwin's work have pursued their own 
supposedly secular theories with an orthodox zeal that would embarrass all but 
the most devoted cleric. In the hands of such evolutionary fundamentalists, 
Darwinism becomes 'a world view that encompasses the hierarchically related 
concepts of change, order, direction, progress, and perfectability'. 4 However, as the 
Oxford quarrel suggests, there is much more at stake in discussing Darwin than a 
recherche biological theorem. Whatever else it is, science is never only science, 
and the difference between science and other pursuits is much less stark than is 
generally conceded: 'the negotiations [between working scientists] as to what 
counts as a proof or what constitutes a good assay are no more or less orderly 
than any argument between lawyers and politicians.' 5 In the case of Darwin, the 
stakes are so high because it provides some propositions about core questions of 
human existence where did it all begin, how did we get here from there, and 
 
perhaps even what can we do about the future-and to do so with the authority of 
a scientific theory. Along with Isaac Newton and Albert Einstein, Darwin is 
considered one of the greatest scientists ever: his work has not only changed the 
way that scientists go about their work, but has affected the way people think 
about the world and their place in it.6 As such, 'Darwin' has come to represent 
something apart from the historical person and published words of Charles 
Darwin. Indeed, what Darwin did and did not mean is much less important than 
what can be said about evolution in the light of Darwin's writings against and 
within a context of twenty-first-century science and sensibilities. 
Nonetheless, insofar as there is something that has come to be called a 
Darwinian account of evolution, it deserves to be distinguished and rescued 
from the spectrum of derivative theoretical offerings that are more Darwinistic 
than Darwinian. It is tantamount to fundamentalism to claim that something is 
or is not true simply because Darwin did or did not say it. It is better to view 
Darwin's theory as a launching pad for various ideas about the phenomenon of 
change and development in the natural world. As Steve Jones has irreverently 
put it, 'evolution is a political sofa that molds itself to the buttocks of the last to 
sit upon it'.7 
In the sense of a discourse of evolution that we are constructing, evolution 
is a variant of the doctrine of progress. It can be traced to the Greeks, of 
whom Aristotle offered the most compelling ideas about the continuity and 
developing nature of all living things. In the intervening centuries it appeared in 
many different incarnations. Yet the common thread to most offerings was that 
there was some notion of progress at work in which the world was not simply 
on the move, but was heading towards some sophisticated end-point, be it 
theological in plan or purpose. Moreover, it was maintained that there was a 
hierarchical arrangement to nature which placed humans at its apex. By the 
 
early nineteenth century, when Darwin took his trip on HMS Beagle to the 
Galapagos Archipelago, the prevailing wisdom among biologists was the 
Lamarckian notion that individuals adapt to their environment and that those 
altered characteristics are inherited by that individual's progeny. Darwin took 
this attractive suggestion and turned it on its head.8 He got the basic idea in 
1838 that: 'in the struggle for existence . . . favourable variations would tend 
to be preserved and unfavourable ones to be destroyed.'9 After over twenty 
more years of experiment and reflection, Darwin published his revolutionary 
Origin of Species in 1859. In this attempt to present a 'long catalogue of facts', 
Darwin's revolutionary contribution was manifold-to suggest how that process 
worked, how seemingly different species are related, how evolution was not 
planned or inevitable, and how Homo sapiens was not only related to more 
primitive life-forms, but also was not the necessary outcome of the 
evolutionary process. Accordingly, Darwin did not so much introduce the idea 
of evolution as develop a particular version of evolution and a view on the 
particular mechanism by which evolution occurs. Conceding that nature had 
the appearance of being designed by some grand and benevolent hand, he 
nevertheless demonstrated that the apparent design was the relentless result 
of chance; a designing deity is displaced by the impression of one that does not 
actually exist. Although Darwin's work is densely packed with his amassed 
evidence and supporting argumentation, the central thesis of On The Origin of 
Species is perhaps simple if entirely innovative. Several ideas are blended 
together explaining a large pool of data-the fossil record-which combine to 
suggest a sort of dynamic of evolution. He selects examples on which to hang 
his argument-leading in quietly, with a discussion of domestication-and 
manages to construct hypotheses that would explain all examples of 
evolution, all 'instances' of the fossil record that could be pointed to as 
 
'proof'. It is a remarkable effect. 
When listed, the conceptual building-blocks might run as follows. Organisms 
create more offspring than can survive. In procreating these offspring, mutations 
occur, randomly it was suspected, and are as likely to be detrimental as beneficial 
to the organism, or to be neutral with respect to survival chances. They do not 
result, as Lamarck had insisted, as a designed function of willed adaptation.10 
Those mutated offspring which are able to survive a given environment will have 
better chances of living to reproduce, and possibly pass along their 'mutuations'. 
Over time and across populations, these variations will accumulate; new 
characteristics and even species will develop and some species will disappear. 
Darwin called this process 'natural selection'. He suspected that there is no 
predetermined path or design to evolutionary development, but could not know, 
and developed his argument so as to suggest this. His work makes it clear that 
he had little tolerance for the view that evolution was either a purifying Platonic 
process in which variant forms are eliminated so that a species' true being can 
assert itself or a Panglossian process in which everything happens for the best. 
Although quantitative change will ultimately result in qualitative difference, 
evolution is basically the long process through which natural selection works on 
genetic variations. To say more than this about Darwin's basic evolutionary thesis 
is to court controversy. But these are, we suggest, the basics of the mainstream 
appreciation of the theory of evolution. In a twist of historical appreciation, 
Darwin's work has come to be treated as much more, as having political, ethical, 
and even religious significance. The struggle to claim the origin and descent of 
Darwinian evolutionary thought for a particular political, ethical, or religious 
campaign has gone on unabated. 
Legal scholars have never been afraid to join the battle. We have chosen to 
divide those initiatives and interpretations into three general groups, the 
 
Darwinians, the Creationists, and the neo-Darwinians, for the purposes of our 
analysis. The next sections outline the basic positions in evolutionary theory, 
which are tracked by positions in legal thinking about common law development. 
Given a little bit of time to acclimatize and update, Bulldog Huxley and Soapy 
Sam Wilberforce would soon be at home in contemporary debates over the 
meaning, significance, and reach of evolution. It is Darwin who might be more 
disturbed at the turn that events have taken, but no less fascinated. 
There is a significant group who hold to a fairly traditional understanding of 
Darwin's ideas. Within this Darwinian camp there are positions that differ on 
questions left open by Darwin. However, they generally turn on differing 
emphases in their explanations rather than on fundamental assumptions. There is 
some division over the pace of evolution: whether evolution proceeds at a steady 
and gradual rate, or by stages of punctuated equilibrium in which change 
happens in geologically brief speciation events separated by long periods of 
stasis, and secondly, on the 'level' at which evolution occurs: the strictly 
genetic, or the interplay of factors at several levels in the organism's 
existence.11 This traditional account, with its modern variations or debates, is 
the well-spring for most analogies between law and evolution and, we suggest, the 
most ubiquitous metaphor or analogy made in mainstream accounts of common 
law development. 
While there are still those who believe in a Genesis-inspired account of 
creation, there is a new Creationist approach that seeks to blend science and 
theology.12 Not only do they assert that evolutionary accounts are wrong because 
God or some higher being is ultimately the hand behind creation, but also these 
Creationist scholars argue that Darwinism is unsubstantiated on the facts, ill 
conceived as scientific method, and mischievously biased. Moreover, mindful 
that available evidence of events over millions of years is limited and 
 
impressionistic, they insist that their own approach is as plausible as any other. 
Exploiting gaps and uncertainties in the fossil record, or the ability of Darwinian 
models to account for 'irreducibly complex' organisms, they suggest that God is 
to be found in the details of 'intelligent design' which characterize evolution, and 
whose purpose and direction is divine but unknowable. We will suggest that a 
popular view of common law development, perhaps most robustly expressed in 
ideas of natural law, partakes quite readily of this Creationist discourse. We return 
to this comparison below. 
The second group of dissidents from traditional Darwinism are the neo-
Darwinians. This motley troop can again be subdivided into so-called social 
Darwinians and ultra-Darwinians. The former cannot resist putting Darwin's 
theorizing to prescriptive effect in a wide array of human affairs; the latter want to 
utilize it to reductionist ends. At their crudest, the social Darwinians persist in 
claims that poor people are poor because they are less fit or that race or gender 
are determinative of various social capacities. The unifying goal of these social 
Darwinians is to offer a prescriptive dimension for future human progress: 
individual struggle becomes both the engine and the engineer of good social 
organization. Huxley was eventually to belong to this camp.13 As a normative 
initiative, it cannot simply be posited as a fact of nature because this assumes 
what is the major bone of contention in ethical and political inquiry; 'facts' and 
'nature' are contested categories.The other neo-Darwinians are the ultra-Darwinians. 
It is not so much that they disagree over the basic Darwinian thesis or that they see 
any grand design at work, it is that they wish to extend Darwin's notion of 
evolution to everything, or perhaps we could say, reduce everything to genetics. 
(Although we note below that the application is more selective than it appears: this 
application usually involves an emphasis on 'natural selection'.) In the same way 
that flora and fauna can be said to thrive as a result of their genes' 'urge' to 
 
survive, so human behaviour is said to be reducible to a similar dynamic. 
Bracketing Darwin's rider 'I am convinced that natural selection has been the main 
but not the exclusive means of modification', 14 they claim that, whereas the gene is 
the basic unit of evolution and the population at large are disposable vehicles for its 
survival, an entity called a meme fulfils a similar role for ideas and concepts.15 It 
gets accused, in the main, of being a 'vulgar reductionism' of human affairs. As 
one commentator has neatly put it, 'even if you can build a bottle from which the 
desired genie emerges, you can't reduce the genie to the bottle once it's out'.16 
This cautionary insight has particular salience for understanding the relevance of 
Darwinian evolutionary theory to law and adjudication. 
 
Jurisprudence and Law 
We turn at last to the applications of evolution in law. The evolutionary metaphor 
has always loomed over jurisprudential efforts to explicate the nature of the 
common law; the work of Maine, Holmes, Wigmore, and Corbin drew heavily 
on the new Darwinian paradigms of their era. However, in the past couple of 
decades or so the effort to utilize evolutionary theory to illuminate legal and 
jurisprudential problems has become much bolder and more explicit.17 
Contributing to a general tendency in the humanities generally, modern jurists 
have now begun to extend this scientific theory not only to explain the past of the 
common law, but also to predict its present dynamic and future direction. 18 
The basic task has been divided into three components: a narrative that explains 
the basic material being described (i.e. case law and legal doctrine), an overall 
direction or purpose to that narrative, and a mechanism which explains how 
changes or development are generated. While some accounts focus on only a 
couple of these components, a few seek to provide an integrated theory that 
 
claims to tie all three together by way of a simple logic or algorithm. We noted 
above that analogies to evolution tend to emphasize the 'selection' and not the 
actual mechanism of change: unsurprising, because that would weaken the 
analogy considerably. In jurisprudence's efforts to utilize Darwin's insights for 
explaining the past history, present practice, and future direction of the common 
law, the same basic intellectual divisions have taken hold. Although these 
positions vary in their details and nuances, they loosely resemble the general 
positions in the scientific debate. As currently understood, the main debate in 
jurisprudence is dominated by the Soapy Sams on the Creationist side and the 
Bulldogs on the neo-Darwinian side. 
In taking this general approach, contemporary jurists participate in the 
much more expansive project of the humanities which attempts to explain the 
idea and history of progress through recourse to the prestigious discourse of 
scientific authority. In these modernist efforts, evolutionary theory has proved 
a useful and authoritative device: its advocates claim to resolve the complex 
mysteries of human progress by reference to one simple formula. This is an 
ambitious project, and if successful will be a truly momentous achievement in 
the history of jurisprudential thought. However, fortunately or unfortunately, 
this project cannot be sustained. Despite its obvious academic allure and 
apparent intellectual pedigree, evolutionary theory has little to offer 
traditional efforts to understand the development and direction of the common 
law. If (and this must remain a moot point) Darwin's basic insights have 
anything to tell lawyers and jurists, it is that evolutionary development is a 
corrosive idea that does more to undercut the grand explanatory ambitions of 
mainstream jurisprudence than to ground or achieve them. Darwinians view 
the world as much more make-do and makeshift than either the legal 
Creationists or some of the prescriptions of neo-Darwinians allow; adaptations 
 
are as likely to be bad as good, and as likely to be a by-product of some other 
adaptive change. As often as not the Darwinian answer to the ubiquitous 
question of 'what is the broader significance or purpose of something?' is 
'nothing'. If this has been a hard lesson for biologists and scientists, it has been 
a near impossible one for lawyers and jurists to learn and accept. 
Ironically, the most potent use of the evolutionary narrative in law has been 
distinctly non-Darwinian (and not infrequently anti-Darwinian) in thrust and 
ambition. Evolution has most often been used as a catch-all term for general 
development and change. Insofar as this usage is entirely casual, those jurists who 
talk about law evolving do not analogize or seek identification with evolutionary 
theory. However, not averse to trading off the hard currency of scientific 
explanation, such theorists connote some aspect of systematic and directed 
development in their accounts of the common law.19 In its more modest 
manifestations, such normative scholarship concentrates on one particular area 
of law and, in a typical boot-strapping manoeuvre, identifies an underlying 
pattern or organizing principle and suggests that the legal doctrine is developing 
to give it better and more coherent expression.20 In its grander form, the claim is 
made that the whole of the law is moving forward in step with the beat of law's 
own distinctive drum. It is contended that, although law and adjudication take 
place within changing social and political conditions, these contexts are simply 
occasions or opportunities for judges to reflect upon and develop law's essential 
character; these contexts are not treated as the source or cause of law's changing 
character. As such, these jurisprudential interventions have a rather inward and 
miraculous quality to them and posit some hidden designer behind law's 
development and direction: it is a much resisted, but barely disguised, form of 
legal Creationism. 'What is law for?' is in many ways an ecclesiastical question. 
In contrast to this dominant strain of contemporary jurisprudence, there is a 
 
variety of scholarship that takes the Darwinian idea of evolution more seriously 
and sympathetically. This reliance on evolutionary narratives ranges from extended 
analogies to full-blown homologies. Viewed collectively as a series of complex 
narratives describing the development of law, morality, social systems, and 
biological explanations of behaviour, they seek to fuse the prestigious cache of 
scientific explanation with the normative framework, imputed or asserted, of legal 
systems. 
This is not the place to delineate a typology of arguments deployed in the 
evolution and law paradigm, but we can suggest some contours. We have 
already noted that there have been two main phases, a traditional and a modern 
phase of evolutionary metaphors. Within the modern phase there are several 
branches exploring different emphases. 
The traditional phase connotes gradualist development over time, usually 
toward some goal or other as seen in hindsight. Examples include works of 
Corbin, Wigmore or Holmes on common law development. Such analogies are 
perhaps the most common use of evolution: those that, in the simplest of ways, 
seek to present development as somehow gradual and inevitable, and at the 
agency of something with law or legal thinking, that gets revealed by judges in 
case law and doctrinal development. The most interesting feature is, to our 
reading, the location of agency in this evolutionary analogy, in a description that 
must marry change and development with some unitary coherence and unchanging 
quality, it is perhaps rhetorically necessary to employ descriptive terms that can 
slip between the passive and the active, or even between descriptive and 
prescriptive. 21 
The modern phase retreats from an explicit directedness to legal development, 
or perhaps relocates it. These analogies to (and homologies with) evolutionary 
theory track developments in that theory, and implications for the law and 
 
evolution paradigm. They especially partake of developments in discourses of 
'non-linear models' as applied to biology, or even outside biology. We suggest that 
there are several schools within this modern phase, including: the 'updated' 
traditional analogy, which might include the attempt to apply genetic models to 
legal concepts via 'meme theory'; the broader autopoeitic models, and 
Habermasian 'learning systems', which are made by explicit analogy to biological 
theory; 'law-and biology' as promulgated most notably by Margaret Gruter and 
her intellectual progeny, which emphasizes homological explanations between 
law and biology; somewhat distinctly, 'complexity theory', 'chaos theory', and other 
catch-words from non-linear modelling and analysis that attempt not so much to 
analogize to another discipline as to use the techniques of modelling from that 
field within or to describe 'legal fields'.22 We suspect that these models, most 
often arising out of advanced mathematics, are employed as latter-day surrogates 
to the Darwinian narrative, in the sense that they provide a form of 'contingent 
closure' by qualitative methods, that is, by methods that describe overall 
determinist systems but that cannot or do not describe individual outcomes. 
Finally we feel that 'law-and-economics' must be included in this category. In 
fact it may be the precursor of 'law-and-biology' in both analogy to and 
homology with models of dynamic systems, complex models of human behaviour, 
strong reliance on mass data, its special emphasis on econometric modelling, the 
operation of a few key principles like efficiency, its historical penetration into 
new disciplines, and its utter lack of predictive value. 
As we have said, we are interested here in teasing out the politics of these 
positions, not in providing a typology. But an increasing sophistication is 
discernible in the analogies or indeed the modelling used in the evolutionary 
paradigm. This includes attempts to vacate these models from any sort of purpose 
or directedness, or to reframe that characterization in terms of stochastic models 
 
including terms of art like exogenous and endogenous factors, equilibria, 
variability, dynamics, and the like. Some go on to claim some 'nature' to law, 
some merely assert that such analogies are good heuristic devices by which we 
might understand change and development in law, and test our hypothesis. 
Although these approaches differ considerably in emphasis and reach, they rely 
upon some notion of Darwinian evolution. And for the purposes of this 
discussion, each theorist tries but fails to avoid falling into the same temptation 
that ultimately ensnared Huxley: to employ the metaphor or even the method as 
proof of prescriptive propositions. A more or less random example is Robert 
Clark's analysis of corporate law. He not only identifies patterns in the 
development of some areas, but seems compelled to attribute them to law's 
universal nature: the drift from descriptive analysis to prescriptive proposal is 
almost seamless.23 Moreover, these legal Darwinians seem unable to keep the 
notions of evolution and progress separate; they not only see change everywhere, 
but treat progress as something that is almost inevitable. Indeed, although many 
of these scholars warn against the pitfalls of a Panglossian mentality, they still 
manage to put a wonderfully positive and normative gloss on law's development. 
In so doing, they begin to desert the one commitment that seems to divide the 
Creationist Soapy Sams from the Darwinian bulldogs: that there is no redemptive 
or miraculous force that is orchestrating or driving the world forward in a 
particular direction and to some preassigned destination. Looked at from a 
traditional Darwinian standpoint, the legal Creationists and the neo-Darwinians 
may simply be flip-sides of the same coin: they both trade in the same moral 
currency and barter in the same market-place, albeit with different styles and 
ambitions. There is no real role for contingency in their models, as there is 
with evolutionary theory, and much of their efforts are directed at minimizing 
that particular implication for law. Let us be clear: we are not insisting that there is 
 
some close analogy between law and biology, especially over the issue of chance. 
We are observing that the techniques used to persuade, that is, a form of 
'contingent closure', are remarkably similar in both camps, notwithstanding their 
different roots and ultimate claims. 
Some will find these claims to be sweeping, and in need of substantiation. 
Instead of ranging broadly and loosely over the whole of the evolutionary terrain, 
we will concentrate on the work of two competing scholars whose work we have 
already introduced. Whereas the work of Ronald Dworkin can fairly be used to 
typify a Creationist perspective, the writings of Richard Posner can reasonably 
be drawn upon to exemplify the neo-Darwinian side. Again, it is important to 
be perfectly clear what we are and what we are not offering.24 Accordingly, we 
suggest that, insofar as evolutionary theory has anything to say about 
development in law (and it is entirely likely that it has very little to say) it tends 
to support 'critical' rather than mainstream accounts of the common law; law 
and adjudication are not the grounded, contained, and predictable practices that 
traditional scholars postulate or imagine. We most certainly do not claim that 
there is an actual Darwinian dynamic at work in the common law's development 
and operation: merely that a similar rhetoric is deployed. 
 
When Dick Met Ronnie 
Although the venue has been suitably ubiquitous in this technological age, the 
occasion for much of the furious and dyspeptic exchanges between Dworkin and 
Posner has been the antics of President Clinton and the validity of (unsuccessful) 
efforts to impeach him. Perhaps this is sufficient indication that the stakes are 
lower than ever. However, like the Oxford debate between Wilberforce and 
Huxley, the agenda is much broader and more polarized: it pits the established 
 
legal order, with its metaphysics, against a 'social scientific' paradigm. Beneath 
the personal invective and collateral point-scoring, there is a very significant 
dispute over the nature and legitimacy of common law adjudication. Having 
inherited the mantle of jurisprudential top dog from Herbert Hart, Soapy Sam 
Dworkin has given eloquent and insistent voice to a naturalist jurisprudence that 
obliges judges to read law's doctrinal history 'in the best light' with a belief that 
the law is 'working itself pure'.25 While such noble work and suitable inspiration 
may elude rank-and-file lawyers, they are not left to their own devices because, 
aided by jurisprudential 'seers and prophets . . . to work out law's ambitions for 
itself, the purer form of law within and beyond the law we have', their 'god is the 
adjudicative principle of integrity' .26 In opposition to this frankly theological 
rendering of the jurisprudential project, Bulldog Posner offers a more pragmatic 
and scientific challenge that eschews all attempts to relate the worth of grand 
theory to the practical operation of the adjudicative task: the law is less a 
theological pilgrimage of legal faith and more a technical craft of bureaucratic 
policy-making. While there is something to admire in each of these positions, there 
is much more to reject. Whereas Posner is a typical lawyer who cannot resist 
turning the powerful descriptive thrust of Darwinian evolution to illegitimate 
prescriptive effect, Dworkin rejects entirely the critical force of evolutionary 
theory and reveals that he is more the Creationist than he might otherwise think 
or wish himself to be. 
For Dworkin, therefore, adjudication is a philosophical adventure of the 
grandest kind, in which formal integrity and abstract coherence are both the 
tools and the goal of intrepid jurists. While every judge might not have the 
necessary Herculean wherewithal to master the arcane equipment of philosophical 
sophistication (which demands that they synthesize all the available historical 
material, construct a perfectly attuned and all-embracing structure, and apply it 
 
consistently to detailed legal problems) what is important is that judges should 
do the best they can by being prepared to embark upon the 'justificatory ascent' 
that might draw them into a more theoretical argument than they originally 
anticipated or wanted. Maintaining that reflective height is the guarantor of 
moral depth, Dworkinian judges are obliged to take a 'theory-drenched' approach, 
even though they might well disagree over what that theory is and how it applies 
to the dispute at hand. None the less, he assures judges and jurists that 'the 
ladder of theoretical ascent is always there, on the cards, even when no one is 
tempted to take even the first step up it'.27 This potent cocktail contains a 
volatile brew of ethical optimism and evolutionary inevitability, which has 
intoxicated many common lawyers and judges. Drinking deep at this particular 
intellectual well, they are reassured that what they are doing is at the same 
time politically attractive, ethically defensible, and impersonally driven. It is 
standard manoeuvre for lawyers and judges to speak of the common law as if it 
had an existence of its own in which there is the arcane 'invisible hand' of some 
benign God-like figure at work in its unfolding and growth. For all his earthy 
wit and political nous, Dworkin's jurisprudence has an entirely otherworldly 
aspect, in which fundamentalist faith and sectarian devotion play a crucial role. 
Soapy Sam Wilberforce would have been proud of such a religious call to 
established arms. 
Although this pietistic tendency to gloss the messy, episodic, and undirected 
workings of the common law as a polished, integrated, and teleological process is 
endemic to much contemporary jurisprudence, it is by no means universal. Many 
lawyers and jurists reject such scholarly spiritualism and its claims that law has a 
miraculous supra-historical life which its faithful juristic adepts can know and 
understand. The idea that law is an immanent whole that transcends the 
accumulated sum of its immediate parts, that there is a simple metaphysical 
 
formula that explains all law, and that legal practice can be rendered 
philosophically pure is seen to be increasingly untenable in a world in which 
lawyers and society at large are increasingly diverse in composition, interests, and 
objectives. These pragmatists insist that their efforts are more grounded, less 
preposterous, and thoroughly practical in aspiration and execution. Dworkin's 
plea for 'justificatory ascent' to some abstract remove from which we can catch 
an echo of the infinitely true and carry it back to society for people's edification and 
enlightenment is exactly the wrong trip to take. Pragmatists argue that progress is 
not about becoming more objective and true, about achieving justificatory height 
in order to attain moral depth, nor about advancing towards some higher more 
removed and abstract plane on which rationality can hold sway outside of the 
disabling influence of interests, commitments, fuzziness, history, culture, and 
ideology: there is no way to escape the politics of human finitude and transmigrate 
to an infinite realm of pure reason that secures people against the need to make 
difficult and always contestable choices. In particular, pragmatists maintain that 
there are no solid and secure footings for law and legal theory that are not 
themselves part of the very political and situated debate that they are intended to 
ground and underwrite. In short, there is no escape from the messy and 
contingent facts of social living. 
The most prominent of these pragmatic critics is, of course, Richard Posner. 
Once a firm believer in the truths of objectivity and integrity himself, he has 
now put his prodigious energy at the service of a more pragmatic creed and 
become a Darwinian bulldog who can only be ignored at lawyers' peril. He 
argues that moral theory not only has little to offer law, but that it is 
positively dangerous to its actual operation. A Dworkinian pilgrimage takes 
judges and jurists off into the kind of ideological and indeterminate speculation 
that is inimical to legitimate lawyering. Drawing explicitly on the writings of 
 
several neo-Darwinians and in the evolutionary wake of his intellectual hero, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, Posner recommends: 
an adaptationist conception of morality, in which morality is judgednon-morally, in the 
way that a hammer might be judged well or poorly adapted to its function of hammering 
nails-by its contribution to the survival, or other goals, of a society.28 
As such, he maintains that judges can act as evolutionary handmaidens by 
facilitating rather than steering society's moral development and progress. For 
Posner, this does not mean that law must be unprincipled or technocratic, only 
that it is wrong to equate 'moral principle to principle, and morality to 
normativity'. Instead, he concludes that what is required is that judges develop 'a 
disposition to ground policy judgments on facts and consequences rather than on 
conceptualisms and generalities'.29 In other words, judges and lawyers must 
eschew moral philosophy for social science. In fulfilling this bureaucratic role, 
Posner recommends that judges and jurists should avail themselves of the 
economists' empirical tools and work to craft useful solutions to pressing and 
practical controversies. 
Dworkin and Posner showcase the practical implications of their jurisprudential 
positions in their discussion of the Glucksberg case on the right to physician-assisted  
suicide.30 For instance, Ronald Dworkin has chastised the Supreme Court for its 
failure to understand fully the philosophical dimension of adjudication and the ethical 
responsibilities of judges in interpreting the Constitution. Having joined with other 
leading liberal philosophers (Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas 
Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson) in submitting an amicus brief in support of the 
respondents, Dworkin was not pleased with the Court's decision. This was not simply 
because it found resoundingly against his particular views on the best moral and 
constitutional position on assisted suicide, but because he considered that the 
Judges had not properly appreciated their sophisticated task as constitutional 
 
interpreters. Dworkin had little good to say about Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas who, 
in taking an entirely historicist approach and insisting that what has been accepted as 
politically fundamental is what is legally fundamental, ignored the philosophical and 
critical element of constitutional adjudication; they reduced it to a crass and 
conservative enterprise in empirical inquiry. On the other hand, although Souter's 
judgment was 'reasonable in principle', 31 Dworkin remained unconvinced that the 
facts were sufficiently in dispute to warrant a hands-off approach by the courts. 
Nevertheless, with characteristic ingenuity, Dworkin refused to accept that all was lost 
and, arguing that five of the six Justices who wrote opinions did not reject his ethical 
stance out-of-hand, hoped that the Court might come to its constitutional senses in 
the future and validate a constitutional right to die. 
Taking the Glucksberg bait, Richard Posner took Dworkin to task for his 
mistaken views on both how the right-to-die claims should be resolved and what 
valid constitutional adjudication should encompass. For Posner, Dworkin was 
barking entirely up the wrong tree in insisting that such disputes require the 
court to participate in moral theory; this is the problem, not the solution, in 
understanding the constitutional role of courts in such ethical controversies. In 
contrast, Posner is adamant that the Supreme Court must deliberately and 
steadfastly refuse to become bogged down in such philosophical quagmires. His 
pragmatic commitments advise that courts best fulfil their institutional roles 
when they 'ground policy judgments on facts and consequences rather than on 
conceptualisms and generalities'. Accordingly, in Glucksberg the Supreme Court 
was correct to stay out of the moral debate around the right to die, and to prefer 
the solid earth of policy analysis to the soggy turf of moral philosophy. There 
was no obviously shared or objective moral resolution available; democracy was 
at work and seemed to be proceeding satisfactorily without judicial interference; 
and the issue demanded very complex rules of implementation which courts are 
 
ill equipped to draft. In advocating such a consequentialist approach to 
decisionmaking, Posner does not intend to abandon principled adjudication in 
favour of ad hoc calculation. He claims that it is simply mistaken to equate 
'moral principle to principle, and morality to normativity'. 32 For Posner, 
Glucksberg therefore is a prime example of the benefits and legitimacy of 
construing constitutional (and general common law) adjudication as a practical 
task of institutional instrumentalities rather than as an abstruse exercise in 
philosophical reflection; whereas the former is something that most judges can 
and should do, the latter is something that most judges cannot and should not do. 
While there is much to appreciate in Posner's pragmatic critique of 
Dworkinian-style theorizing, this audacious proposal that the empirical tools of 
economists are morally neutral and ought to be adopted by judges is no less 
troubling. Indeed, like the earlier Bulldog, Posner manages to subvert Darwinian 
ideas in the process of championing them; he turns a valid descriptive analysis 
into an illegitimate prescriptive theory. At the end of the day, by replacing 
moral philosophy with social science, he is in the same theological game as 
Dworkin of telling society what it should do if it wants to be a better society. 
While it is true that judges and jurists would do well to take greater heed of the 
sociopolitical context in which they work and of the actual consequences of their 
decisions and suggestions, it is absurd to imagine that this can be done without 
resort to social values or political commitments. As an empirical matter, it is 
simply not the case that there is 'a fair degree of value consensus among the 
judges', such that they can 'seek the best results unhampered by philosophical 
doubts'.33 Whether in an ethical or scientific guise, theory cannot provide a 
method that will relieve people from the responsibility and challenge of 
constantly arguing and rearguing what should and should not be done in 
particular contexts at particular times. Dworkin is surely right when he argues 
 
that Posner's claims about the political process are not descriptive or technical 
but moral, in the sense that they are not only judgements about how best to 
achieve stipulated goals, but highly controversial claims about the distribution 
and exercise of government powers and the limits imposed by respect for 
individual moral rights: '[Posner] calls for the death of moral theory, but, like all 
of philosophy's would-be undertakers, he only means the triumph of his own 
theory.'34 
While Dworkin is right to chastise Posner for drawing on values, he is 
mistaken to maintain that this can only be done by buying into the kind of 
theological theorizing in which Dworkin specializes. There is nothing wrong with 
suggesting that 'survival of the fittest' or a related standard is a worthy goal, but 
this cannot be done under cover of evolutionary theory. It simply has to be 
defended like any moral or political theory. In particular, as a normative initiative, 
it cannot simply be posited as a fact of nature because this assumes what is the 
major bone of contention in ethical and political inquiry: what count as 'facts' 
and 'nature' are contested categories. However, a sound defence does not entail the 
kind of grand theorizing that Dworkin proposes. For Dworkin there is no choice 
other than objective truth-'a matter of how things really are'-or subjective 
opinion-'in our own breasts'. 35 Anything that does not live up to the objective 
standards of truth is mere conviction, mere convention, mere ideology, etc. This 
kind of either/or, all-or-nothing thinking misrepresents the possibilities. To be 
against objective truth does not mean that one is left with only subjective 
opinion; and to be against only subjective opinion does not imply that one is 
defending the existence of objective truth. Although the traditional search for 
objectivity is a lost cause, there are not only subjective opinions and relativized 
truths. Instead, one truth is not as good as another if one understands by truth 
nothing more than that it meets the familiar procedures of justification that 
 
hold sway. It is not about striving to reach a promised land of truth that will 
make further justification unnecessary. Instead, jurisprudence must become more 
useful such that success is not vouchsafed by reliance upon a particular epistemic 
method, but by the usefulness of the results arrived at and their effect upon 
meeting certain objectives that are taken to be morally or politically significant: 
moral choice is 'always a matter of compromise between competing goods 
rather than a choice between the absolutely right and the absolutely wrong•.36 
Accordingly, instead of reflecting with Dworkin upon universality to justify 
particular principles (which will turn out anyway as little more than a cover for 
the theorists' own political or moral agenda) there should be talk along with 
Posner about the concrete and relative advantages of choosing one over another. 
However, such talk must be openly moral and political; there is no scientific or 
factual way to finesse that responsibility and opportunity. Sadly, Posner is 
pragmatic in the most unpragmatic of ways. Because he accepts much of the 
contextual situation as given, he restricts himself to tinkering with present 
arrangements and remains profoundly abstruse and rationalistic in his analysis: 
'abstract universality' is ditched, only to be replaced with 'abstract particularity'. 
There is little appreciation that legal reasoning operates in the real world of 
historical struggle or of how law does (and does not) change.37 Giving the idea 
of social practices a more political than ethical spin brings the operation of 
power into the centre of debate; consensus (and therefore standards of persuasion 
and justification) can be treated as imposed as much as chosen. In moving from 
truth to usefulness, a thoroughly pragmatic jurisprudence does not set out to know 
things as they really are a la Dworkin or to isolate a scientific criterion of usefulness 
a la Posner. In responding to the compelling question of what to do next, 
both  Dworkin  and Posner  answer with far too much certainty or confidence than 
 
is good for them or for anyone else: knowledge and usefulness are not stable or 
secure footings on which the houses of law can be safely constructed. A 
Darwinian-informed pragmatism is much less modest and much more 
experimental. And it is to an elaboration of such a perspective that we now 
turn. In Darwinian terms, law is one more set of tools through which human 
beings are struggling to cope with the contingent circumstances of their 
environment and with the realization that these efforts, like the best-laid plans of 
Robbie Burns' mice and men, often come to nought. 
 
Between A Rock and A Watch 
When Charles Darwin went to Christ's College at Cambridge University in 1827, 
he stayed in the same rooms as had the former student and fellow, William Paley, 
fifty years before. Although there is no reason to think that this was more than 
a matter of curious coincidence, the lives of the two men share a certain 
synchronicity. In completing his degree, the young Darwin was obliged to study 
Paley's extensive writings. A theological scholar of some repute, he had been an 
eloquent proponent of the socalled argument-by-design rejection of evolution. 
Paley's central contention was that the sheer complexity of biological organisms, 
especially humans, defied explanation as being the result of chance evolution rather 
than deliberate design: 
 
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the 
stone came to be there; I might possibly answer that, for anything I knew to the 
contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the 
absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it 
should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of 
the answer I had before given, that for anything I knew, the watch might have always 
 
been there.38 
Darwin was much taken by Paley's work and, in an important sense, spent 
much of his life demonstrating why Paley's claims were false and that even the 
most complex of biological creatures or designs required no designing hand or 
orchestrating intent. However, the most complete refutation of Paley did not come 
until 1986 when Richard Dawkins took on Paley fairly and squarely. Using 
Paley's own examples, he showed how it was even more wondrous and awe-
inspiring that nature's intricate complexity should be the result of gradual and 
insistent evolution over time than the draughtsmanship of a designing deity. 
Emphasizing the unplanned, unconscious, and automatic processes of nature, 
Dawkins concluded that: 
natural selection . . . has no purpose in mind, . . . has no mind and no mind's eye, . . . 
does not plan for the future, . . . has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all . . . [and,] if 
it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker.39 
Darwin was vindicated. And there is no reason to assume that he would have 
been anything but impressed and approving of Dawkins' efforts. Nevertheless, 
while Dawkins' work did little more than further confirm and corroborate 
Darwin's ideas, the extent to which Dawkins and others have been prepared to 
push that claim has proved controversial. Not content with explaining the 
evolution of all biological organisms in line with a Darwinian evolutionary 
dynamic, they have made the audacious claim that the behaviour of such 
organisms (again, especially that of humans) is entirely explicable in the same 
terms. Whether scavenging for food or shopping for watches, whether 
scrambling for sexual supremacy or reflecting on sexual mores, humans and other 
organisms are striving to adapt to their environment and ensure the survival of 
the fittest. This is a bold and unsettling claim that has considerable relevance to 
the debate about the development and operation of the common law. Of course, 
 
the power of a good idea is to be found in its limits as well as its depth. In this, 
Darwinian evolution is no exception. What tends to divide Darwinians is less 
the precise operation of an evolutionary dynamic, although there are competing 
views over this issue, but the general scope of its applicability. 
Probably the main bone of contention between the Darwinians and ultra-
Darwinians is the application of Darwin's ideas to human behaviour. 40 There is 
general agreement that, because humans are a species, their creation and 
development are readily explicable by the logic of Darwinian evolution. This does 
not mean 
that the existence of humans was inevitable or planned and nor does it mean 
that their continued existence is guaranteed. Like dinosaurs and dodos, humans are 
vulnerable to the extreme deprivations of their natural environment. This may be 
so, and as legal writers we are ill-equipped to evaluate the notion. But we can 
suggest some troubling points for at least the traditional understanding of 
'evolution'. Unlike all other organisms (to date), humans have a greater and 
more sophisticated capacity for conscious planning and for impacting the 
environment in which they live; they manage to affect and shape their 
environment as they are affected and shaped by it. Consequently, human 
development is not entirely reactive or adaptive; people are able to exert a 
powerful influence on some of the factors-notably, those that are emphasized in 
'selection' or a notion of a naturally-occurring 'environment.'41 This means that 
any attempt to reduce the study of human activity to familiarity with the same 
evolutionary dynamic as works for fish and fowl may be ultimately unconvincing: 
it may be futile to ask 'are humans evolving?' in the traditional sense. 
A key question, therefore, for Darwinian adherents is how to account for 
those human behaviours that are the result of conscious planning and intellectual 
design-can they be brought within the explanatory provenance of a modified 
 
Darwinian dynamic or are they outside its descriptive ambit and, therefore, a 
challenge to its whole scientific status? One of those human processes is law 
which, at bottom, is a collective human endeavour to cope with and control 
human affairs, and perhaps even the world around us; it is an artefact, like 
morality and psychology, that seeks to check as much as adapt to the 
environmental forces which comprise its nurturing context. Accordingly, at the 
heart of the intersection between evolution and law are the problematic claims 
for the nature of human progress and the progress of human nature. 
Biologists might safely limit their project to describing how evolution 
works: but accounts of law cannot take the narrower scope, for their subject 
matter is ethics, or politics if you will. To biology, it hardly seems necessary to 
add the human elements of will, design and purpose (which some use 
evolution to support) which are very likely not knowable entirely through 
experiment or 'long catalogues of facts'. Since the first wave of social Darwinism, 
this unknowability has been challenged or imputed in different ways by the 
claims of sociobiology, law-and-biology, etc. In terms of the actual cause of 
change in individuals and species, the prevailing doctrine in evolutionary 
biology is clearly committed to the view that random change or chance errors in 
replication at the genetic level actually cause variation in individuals. This 
concept of change is at odds with most uses of the evolutionary metaphor in law 
and works quite against the traditional directed idea of an evolutionary 
narrative. As such, the exact correspondence of law and biology is not 
supportable. Law does not have 'species' nor does change occur independent 
of human endeavour, it is not directly subject to the theory of evolution or 
its explanatory power, no matter at what level evolution operates. The only 
plausible comparison between law and biology is in terms of relative analogy. 
Because humans are perhaps the only beings that have been able to transform 
 
their own environment so radically, it is not easy to claim that such behaviour 
is 'selected' in the classical narrative sense so that there is a sense of directed 
change; it is better seen as part of a more complex interplay between humanity 
and its environment. If law is a social construct and human behaviour is 
transformative of its context, there is a very different dynamic at work from 
that of the traditional evolutionary metaphor. Moreover, as well as its 
troublesome naturalistic (i.e., explanatory power converts to predictive authority) 
and deterministic tendencies (i.e., genetic or behavioural traits are 
predetermined), the evolutionary narrative also works equally badly the other 
way by reducing law's ethical dimension to bare description; this is simply 
another way of attempting to further the illusion that law is separate from 
politics and to deny the force of the critical claim that 'law is politics'. 
Saying this much may merely be accusing proponents of evolution in law of 
making selective analogies or choosing poor metaphors, and to suggest how such 
constructs are ultimately unpersuasive. But a sense of the broader challenges-the 
accusations of vulgar reductionism, or thinly disguised theism, and even the 
import of a measure of indeterminacy, as we have suggested above, have all led 
to attempts to improve the model. The most theoretically interesting is probably 
the latter, which has led, we suggest, to the analogies to various forms of 
qualitative reasoning in other areas (including biology) that themselves try to cope 
with levels of indeterminacy within deterministic systems. It is easy to see the 
attractions for accounts of common law development. 
Some efforts to overcome some of these debilitating problems have 
concentrated on developing a parallel and complementary process to Darwinian 
accounts of biological change that can explain cultural development. For instance, 
Jack Balkin has sought to provide an account of how shared understandings in 
law grow and spread from one generation to another. Drawing on the work of 
 
Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, he picks up on an understanding of natural 
selection as a neutral, algorithmic process, applicable to an extremely wide range 
of phenomena and capable of achieving immense feats by slow accumulation 
over large extents of time and space. Balkin contends that, while basic 
physiological information is contained in genes and is passed down through 
reproduction to new generations, there are also 'memes' which play a similar 
function to genes in facilitating the transmission of abstract ideas through cultural 
exchange over time. He argues that all mental and cultural life, including law, is 
adequately explainable by a mechanical Darwinian process of natural selection in 
which genes and memes struggle for survival. Seeking to fuse concepts of 
function in biology and meaning in philosophy, the theory utilizes adaptionism 
as a fertile source of both biological and social explanations. Rejecting the notion 
of any Panglossian tendency at work, Balkin asserts this evolutionary process is 
less Darwinian than Lamarckian in that adaptation and variation occur in direct 
response to the environment rather than as part of a contest between random 
variations to fit better the environment.42 In short, he offers a less assertive form 
of autopoietic development using mimetic units. However, in attempting to 
provide a scientific basis for cultural evolution, from a political-ethical 
perspective, Balkin manages to offer a process that is clinical and sterile in its 
political content; his theory of ideology is all so neutral and comforting in 
presenting the interaction between people and their social environment as relatively 
benign and harmless. Moreover, the alleged analytical strength of this kind of ultra-
Darwinian theorizing runs out at the very point at which it might be thought to be 
most needed; the Panglossian tendency cannot be so easily cabined or contained. 
Like other homological approaches, such an approach rests (consciously or 
unconsciously) on the applicability of forms of measurement of problems within 
the home fields (biology, sociology, even epidemiology) within the 'legal fields'. 
 
There are a couple of initial objections to these explanations of change and 
development when applied to law. The first is that, like the traditional 
evolutionary narrative, the method may risk serious misapplication outside the 
'home' discipline or problem. The applications of 'chaos theory' or 'catastrophe 
theory' are a couple of examples with filiations in biology. Aside from their 
nomenclatural problems (they are really misnomers in the common sense of those 
words), these two theories are models that select a fact or two out of a large 
tangle of them, and suggest patterns of subordinate facts, much in the way 
evolution does. They are not predictive or determinative, merely suggestive of 
an explanation, a mathematical guess at a pattern to look for. They provide, in 
use, a form of very formal contingent closure to a proposition, but (we contend) 
there is not an overriding theoretical or evidential reason to prefer this form of 
proof over any other. Additionally, the suite of propositions to which they may 
be applied is probably limited, and they do not appear (on our cursory reading) 
to be generalizable to fields such as ethics or even something called 'law and 
biology', notwithstanding attempts to characterize, say, prison mutinies as 
'dissipative systems' obeying the contours of Rene Thom's catastrophe theory, or 
applications of Lorenz's 'sensitivity to initial conditions' to literary theory. Our 
main interest is the attraction these forms of qualitative reasoning-those coping 
with some level of indeterminacy-have for legal theorists. 
At any rate, they may have another related but more serious limitation: they 
are descriptive models, and like much economic analysis, they have very little to 
say, strictly speaking, about how law, an ethical inquiry, will or ought to 
develop. If we take law seriously as an ethical enterprise, we do ourselves a 
disservice to then re-invent (reveal?) patterns of human nature that law must 
obey. Yet these models are employed as a sort of rhetorical proof, resplendent 
with the nomenclature of higher mathematics, that suggest this very step, as we 
 
have argued at length above. The use of these analogies and metaphors is not 
limited use, and they contain understandably attractive qualities to those writing 
about common law problems.43 But they are ultimately unpersuasive of the 
'evolution' of common law. 
However, to resist the ambitious claims of these ultra-Darwinian theorists does not 
mean that a Darwinian explanation has no role to play in explaining and understanding 
legal development. To challenge cultural determinism is not to align oneself with the 
genetic determinists and to reject socio-biology is not to subscribe to a Creationist 
creed. Too often, what begin as correctives to the excesses of existing theories 
become full-blown and equally excessive alternative theories. Dworkin is surely right 
when he insists that 'moral reflection, through various layers of justificatory ascent 
including the philosophical, is as much a part of human nature as anything else'.44 
Yet, to deny the universalistic and deterministic claims of a pseudo-scientific 
approach to law and adjudication is not equivalent to taking the position that 
philosophy and justificatory ascent are equally determinative or comprehensive in 
their description of law. Even if judges did all engage in such heady flights, there is 
no reason to think that the resulting abstraction would be congruent or coherent. 
Indeed, the assertion that there is some presence or generation of Purpose(s) from 
within the legal system itself is very problematic. Even assuming that law can be 
described as something organically distinct from other practices of political human 
behaviour, the phenomena described (i.e., laws, doctrines, cases, etc.) are actually 
characterized as passive or automated entities. However, as soon as the analysis shifts 
to self-movement, learning, and self-reflexivity, the entity has itself assumed to have 
some form of active life. In rhetorical terms, there has been a slippage from scene 
to agent and from description to purpose in which the system itself is imbued with a 
definite normative content. From that point on, it is all too quickly and easily 
presumed that uniform behaviour gets treated as evidence of a unity or harmony of 
 
interests. This becomes an invisible hand in classical economics, is generalized and 
made more systematic as class interests in Marxian economics, and manifests as 
normative coherence in liberal jurisprudence. (We note here that in this sense Smith 
was the original author of the ‘communistic fiction’). 
But of course, ascribing a 'harmony of interests' does not do the work of 
explaining transformation in law without importing an operating principle of 
agency from outside. In fact, these systemic narratives of evolution attempt to 
have it both ways in their insistence that agency and context combine to 
produce change: the organism of law becomes depicted as something more than a 
passive body of conjoined phenomena, but not sufficiently active or political to 
be an integrated part of the larger political world. 
The whole idea of law 'working itself pure' is anathema to any kind of 
evolutionary account of law. Even under the most modest and non-systemic 
account, evolution is most certainly not a purifying process in which deviant 
forms are eliminated so that a species' true being can assert itself. Also, such a 
jurisprudential account runs up against the problem that, if law became perfectly 
adapted to its social and philosophical role, any change in the environment 
would immediately ensure that law was unsuited and unresponsive to challenges 
that occurred. As such, if the idea of law 'working itself pure' is to have any 
validity or bite, it must rest on a particular theory of social development-that 
society will also reach a point of political equilibrium in which social tensions are 
in both philosophical and practical harmony-that is both fantastical and 
reactionary. Such assumptions place Legal Creationists in the dubious camp of 
end-of-history prognosticators like Francis Fukuyama who maintain that 'there is 
a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary patent for 
all human societies-in short, something like a universal History of mankind in 
the direction of liberal democracy.'45 Hegel never had such strange bedfellows: 
 
but if that is a serious proposition, then we might legitimately wonder how it 
is to be proved in so open a system. The contingent closure of the evolutionary 
narrative provides a handy argument. Ironically, in rejecting the merit of a 
Darwinian approach to legal and political development, these liberal democrats 
rely on exactly the same kind of evolutionary trope in explaining and 
justifying the working-pure character of law and social institutions. As such, the 
denial of Darwinian insights' relevance to legal and social development is both 
contradictory and confusing. 
Accordingly, the challenge for those who insist upon the pertinence of 
Darwinian evolutionary insights for law is to include and explain the role that such 
'moral reflection' plays in human behaviour and social development generally. 
What people do is affected by what people think they are doing. Unlike with 
other creatures in the rest of the natural world, humans are a species that has self-
consciousness and, therefore, can reflect upon the nature of its own doing. In this, 
lawyers are no different from other social actors. To different extents and with 
varying awareness, what lawyers do is affected by what it is that they think that 
they are doing and what it is that they think that they ought to be doing. 
Without some incorporation of that crucial element in any explanatory equation, 
the effort to understand judicial practice and legal development will be found 
wanting. Where we might say Darwinism is about variation and contingency, a 
Dworkinian jurisprudence is about convergence and purification. Insofar as the 
constraints on evolution are historical and environmental, behaviours only 
change to the extent that the local context allows or requires. As one biologist 
neatly captures the operation of the evolutionary dynamic, 'the archaic features of 
life merely reveal its tortuous history, like the archaic features of human 
language or common law.'46 Any effort to obscure or sidestep that history will fail 
to capture an important dynamic in law's development. Rather than being on a 
 
pre-assigned route to some exalted or transcendental state, the common law is 
simply a continuing work-inprogress that is always moving, but never arriving and 
that is always on the road to somewhere, but never getting anywhere in 
particular. Perhaps what really demands explanation in the common law is not the 
phenomenon of change, but the existence of stability. 
 
A Modest Proposal 
It has lately become the fashion (again) to marry a criticism with a proposal, no 
matter what sort of progeny such a marriage may produce. Wishing to uphold 
critical vows, and live by them, we offer some tentative thoughts about how we 
might frame a discussion of change and development in the common law, with an 
emphasis on location of change and development, and the very political and 
contingent character of law. 
The illusion of total command is maintained by a willingness to accept that the 
environment will need to be respected. While it is true that law might 'evolve in 
the direction of greater fit with its environment',47 there will always be a 
productive tension between the law's notion of fit and the changing social, 
political, and cultural make-up of that environment. In short, law will always be a 
relatively open-ended and stylized form of politics in which 'anything might go'. 
That 'anything' rarely does go is an indicator not of natural qualities to law, but 
of persistently constructed constraints that need examining for relevance and 
validity. This is arguably what law does, albeit imperfectly. 
Even if law is understood as an adaptive process through which people mediate 
the always contingent, usually contested, and often contradictory demands of 
human living, there is no reason to think that it will have any great success. 
Indeed, the very criteria for assessing success will be as contingent and 
 
contested as the process itself. Whereas ultra-Darwinians are intent upon 
demonstrating that almost all human behaviour can be explained as having its 
roots and explanation in the biological adaptation to environmental conditions, 
Gouldians insist that much human behaviour is maladapted and is likely to be the 
unanticipated result of something which did have an adaptive function. In 
short, the world is too contingent and complex to submit to such reductionist 
accounts. Often, the answer to the ubiquitous question of 'what is the purpose of 
X?' is 'nothing'. X developed as a by-product of some other adaptive change 
and, as such, might or might not turn out to be more useful and lasting than the 
initial adaptive change itself. Similar to the biological world, the legal world has 
its share of maladaptation in that the good and the bad, the adaptive and the 
maladaptive, can be packaged in a single unit (the Good-Bad) that must be taken 
as a whole. Unlike the wishful thinking of many jurists, law may be closer to the 
scenario of jerry-built morphology, second-best physiology, and makeshift 
behaviour: 'the useless, the odd, the peculiar, the incongruous' are the 'signs of 
history' that are as much part of the evolutionary narrative as any other and, if 
excluded or marginalized, will entirely invalidate any account.48 In an open 
system, it is probably impossible to bring all instances of the proof within the 
proposition. It can only appear so. 
As such, one consequence of this ought to be some recognition that there is no 
one and even no optimal strategy for dealing with the biological or legal world 
that can guarantee success. Also, in some configurations, the adaptionist 
argument is so banal that it gets no further than the Creationist. Because 
everything that does happen must happen, so to speak, it has no critical edge or 
interesting force, and instead lulls us into a deeper dogmatic slumber. In our 
appropriated Darwinian vocabulary, adaptation is a process of becoming rather 
than a state of final optimality, because any reliance on the notion of perfect 
 
optimality would undercut the constant dynamism at work in nature and pave 
the way for the resurgence of Creationist thinking. 
Knowledge of the 'how' of evolution does not mean that we are any more 
likely to know or calculate what will happen next by way of predicting future 
development or direction. Rather than grope vainly towards a theory of 
everything for everywhere at every time, it is better to think of trying to draw 
more pragmatic lessons from legal traditions, development, and change. Some 
of the law and evolution paradigm does just this, subject to the criticisms we 
have laid out here. The question 'what do we want law to be, and how has that 
been achieved traditionally, in any given circumstance?' is a better focus than 
'What is law's essential nature?' Of course, there can be workable theories of 
development and change, even some level of prediction at a very local level and in 
specific contexts, but the 'larger questions' might never be resolvable in any useful 
or persuasive manner: the contingencies of social life, and our very limited 
understanding of them, ensure that confidence or certainty in final solutions will 
remain elusive. This is no bad thing. As Popper delightfully noted, 'there can 
be no explanation which is not in need of a further explanation' .49 Or, to 
express that in a way more salient to this essay, legal theory is never an answer 
that can speak for itself: it all depends on the political context, which of 
course always speaks out of both sides of its mouth and in a garbled accent. 
In terms of law, therefore, it is important to grasp that an evolutionary 
perspective is not about generating an agenda for change or a justification for 
law's particular development. Instead, it is about developing an attitude or 
approach to law that recommends, among other things, cultivating a healthy 
scepticism about formulaic recipes for legal success, about simplistic notions of 
legal progress, about the predictive power of so-called rational planning, about 
the temptation of reductionist explanations, and about the sense that we are or 
 
can ever be entirely on top of things, even if we are in the Hart Chair in Oxford. 
Lawyers need to nurture situation-sense and practical savvy as much as 
philosophical sophistication and abstract theorizing. Evolution talks in terms of 
natural selection as being about solving problems, but it must not be forgotten 
that it has nothing to tell us about the problems that will require solutions: this is 
a crucial insight for law as well as certain stripes of evolutionists. In a 
jurisprudential manner of speaking, common law judges offer up what they 
believe to be the best answer to a problem out of a series of possible good 
answers. However, in law as in biology, it remains the case that 'even if you 
can build a bottle from which the desired genie emerges, you can't reduce the 
genie to the bottle once it's out'.50 Nor, it can be added, is it possible to 
understand what the genie is capable of doing without appreciating the origins of 
the genie, its relation to the bottle, and the forces that brought it into play in 
the first place. 
As with much else, the relation between biology and human behaviour, 
including theories about their relationship, is likely to be variable, complex, and 
indirect. In an important sense, this tension in law constitutes one more corner of 
the action in the familiar battle between 'nature' and 'nurture'. It is hard to 
believe that it is an either/or choice. It is perhaps safer to suggest that it is a mix 
of both which occurs in a contingent and intricate way.51 Accordingly, although 
it might be tempting to dismiss all law-andbiology positions as vulgarly 
reductionist or crass essentialism, it would be mistaken. While law's development 
cannot be reduced to a simple evolutionary dynamic, this does not mean that 
there are no evolutionary forces at work. The role of evolutionary factors will be 
appropriately contingent and changeable. Viewed in this way, both Dworkin and 
Posner can be understood as being right and wrong. They are right because their 
accounts do offer robust insights into how the law is viewed, created, and 
 
changed; they each have something to tell us about the dynamics of legal change 
and judicial reasoning. But they are wrong in that they treat those helpful 
insights as universal sagacity about the nature of law and adjudication. The kind 
of non-foundationalist critique that we have offered is only partially concerned 
with questioning the explanatory validity of law-and-economics  and law-and-
biology accounts, but is certainly troubled by normative or totalizing claims. 
These accounts still may be invalid, or at least not useful models for legal 
behaviour, but this is not to deny their attempts to understand it in a systematic 
way. To the extent that these systems provide explanations of the development of 
law and manage to avoid creating false notions of autonomy or positing internal 
values to legal systems, they are useful projects that can indeed tell us something 
about legal development and change. However, when so understood, they cease to 
be the kind of foundationalist theories which both Dworkin and Posner offer, and 
instead they become non-foundationalist projects. 
 
Conclusion 
In this essay we have not sought to assert the claim that evolution is applicable to 
legal development. To be sure, law is a self-reflective process of rational 
thinking, but it is far from reducible to an activity governed by a strict 
philosophical discipline that is entirely internal to legal practice. All the talk 
about grand purposes or guiding minds is pitched at such a high level of 
generality that what they might or might not recommend in any particular 
situation is almost impossible to predict. Or, to turn that around, the solution 
to any particular problem can be interpreted in accordance with a variety of very 
different, often competing, and occasionally contradictory ideals, each of which 
can claim a plausible threshold purchase on the extant legal materials. 
 
Consequently, while law is undeniably a teleological enterprise in that judges act 
with a purpose, the system as a whole cannot be said to have a directing mind 
such that it moves forward in one direction as if pulled along toward a given 
goal. Even the characterization of a 'harmony of interests' is problematic. 
Indeed, after Darwin it has become possible to admit that 'humans have to dream 
up the point of human life and cannot appeal to a non-human standard to 
determine whether they have chosen wisely . . . [and that] the meaning of one 
human life may have little to do with the meaning of any other human life, while 
being none the worse for that'.52 In law there are many theoretical possibilities, 
but the actual decision made is as much about external circumstances as 
anything else: principles prosper or perish not only by dint of their intellectual 
merit, however that might be measured, or by ethical sophistication, but also by 
their capacity to adapt to material conditions. Holmes' warning has been ignored, 
especially by those evolutionary jurists who claim to follow in his intellectual 
footsteps: 'we have evolution in this sphere of conscious thought and action no 




We have presented a brief metaphor for change and development in law, but 
this is just an example to suggest other emphases in critical thinking. Ours is not 
a claim that the common law is one thing or another. In particular, we do not 
contend that the common law does or does not function and develop in line with 
an evolutionary logic. The most that can be said is that, insofar as evolutionary 
theory has anything to say about law (and it is entirely likely that it has very little 
to say) it tends to support 'critical' rather than mainstream accounts of the common 
law. By that, we mean that treating law as if it were susceptible to an evolutionary 
explanation does not advance the jurisprudential cause of those who insist on 
claiming a certain autonomy, simplicity, systemization, and directionality to law's 
 
development. Far from it: if anything, viewing law through the lens of 
evolutionary theory offers some support to the central critical claims that 'law is 
politics' and that the nature of that connection is unpredictable and contingent: 
law's operation and practice simply will not conform to a reductionist and 
predictive algorithm. The salutary lesson of the evolution debate is that the best 
story is the one that weaves together lots of different threads in a quilt which is 
as complex and as complementary as circumstances allow; there is no one set of 
simple rules that can capture or explain the complexity and contingency of life. 
Indeed, in a lesson that is singularly pertinent to law, it is stability or stasis that is 
to be explained, understood, and perhaps even justified. 
Abandoning the solace of divine procreation ought not to be a cause for 
despair or resignation. Instead, it might galvanize jurists into the realization that 
'moral inquiry is our struggle, not nature's display'.54 And, insofar as law is one of 
the main institutional sites and practices through which contemporary society 
takes part in that struggle, lawyers and judges might accept their participation as 
genuine surrogates for the democratic citizenry, not as false conduits for a 
philosophical truth. Evolution is a responsibility, not a necessity. Neither the 
Soapy Sams nor the Bulldogs of the jurisprudential world exhaust the 
possibilities for understanding law's development. We need both of them: one as a 
hopeful reminder that we must strive to rise above the limitations of our own 
predicament and interests, and the other as a sober caution that we are as much 
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